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ATTRIBUTION AND INFERENCE 
IN THE INTERPRETATION OF CANDID 
AND STAGED FILM EVENTS 
PAUL MESSARIS 
MICHAEL PALLENIK 
The two experiments described in this paper deal with the 
following question: What difference does a viewer's 
assessment of the degree of control exercised in the 
production of a film or videotape make in the way a viewer 
will interpret the events portrayed? By "control" we mean 
the assessment by the viewer that the filmmaker or TV 
producer does something deliberately, with the express 
purpose of implying something to his audience. In our 
conclusions we shall discuss what difference these ways of 
interpreting will make to our understanding of how we deal 
with real and symbolic worlds. 
There are varying degrees to which control can enter into 
the process of film or TV production. Most fiction films and 
TV dramas represent one extreme along this spectrum. 
Actors, costumes, and settings are chosen deliberately, the 
action is scripted, camera positions and movements are 
predetermined, and editing conforms to a plan. In short, 
control is as complete and all-encompassing as possible, and 
it is exercised in order to communicate a specific story, 
moral, or observation. 
On the other hand, there are many instances in which the 
person responsible for the production of a film (or TV 
program, or videotape) exercises less control over the 
process. One example might be the researcher recording data 
of "behavior" for further study. An extreme example might 
be the television tapes that are produced by surveillance 
cameras in banks. The security agencies which produce these 
tapes have almost no influence on the content of the final 
product. Although they set up the camera in a certain 
position and they determine when it will be on or off, what 
ends up being recorded by their camera is not of their 
making. These videotapes may be taken as examples of 
minimal control. 
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Let us return, now, to the question with which this paper 
opened: How are viewers' interpretations affected by the 
degree of "perceived" control that went into the making of a 
film, videotape, etc.? More precisely, how, if at all, do 
viewers' interpretations take account of the degree of control 
which they believe to have been exercised? As a hypothetical 
case, assume that a viewer is confronted with a number of 
video tapes made in a bank with the kind of surveillance 
camera mentioned above. The viewer picks five minutes' of 
tape to look at, and then we ask him to interpret what he 
saw. Since he knows the circumstances under which the tapes 
were made, i.e., since he knows that no director or 
script-writer has staged what he is looking at, we should 
expect him to use his knowledge of "real life" in making his 
interpretations. In other words, this hypothetical viewer 
might reasonably be expected to draw upon his own 
experience with banks, together with his beliefs about human 
behavior, in forming opinions about the type of bank shown 
in the tape, its probable location, the probable backgrounds 
anc personality characteristics of the various customers, and 
the like. 
Now, assume that we take the same five-minute piece of 
tape and show it to a different viewer. This time, however, 
we attach a title and a list of credits at the beginning of the 
video tape, and we tell this viewer that what he is seeing is 
the beginning of a telemovie. Under··these circumstances, we 
would expect his interpretations to be made in a different 
way. If he believes us and treats what he sees as a deliberately 
staged piece of action, we would expect his interpretations to 
be aimed at inferring the filmmaker's (or TV producer's) 
intended meaning. More specifically, it seems to us a 
reasonable assumption that, under these circumstances, the 
viewer would treat the elements of the scene before him as 
purposeful contributions to the beginning of a story I ine and 
interpret them accordingly. (In doing so, he might be 
expected to use his knowledge of the conventions of 
whatever genre he thinks the movie represents. If, for 
instance, he thinks that he is watching a crime drama, he 
might try to sort out the people appearing in the tape into 
the various kinds of protagonists of a "typical" hold-up 
scene.) 
We shall refer to the first of the two kinds of 
interpretational strategies outlined above (i.e., what the first 
hypothetical viewer does) as attribution. The second kind of 
strategy we shall call inference. Attribution, then, is the use 
of one's knowledge of real I ife in making an interpretation. 
Inference is the effort to make an interpretation conform to 
one's assumptions about the filmmaker's intention, or, more 
precisely, to one's assumption that the event in question was 
intended at all -was other than an accidental or haphazard 
concatenation of visual events. 
The term "attribution" was borrowed from an area of 
social psychology (attribution theory) which deals with the 
process by which people interpret behavior they observe in 
their real-life environment. The correspondence - obviously 
not exact-between that process and the one for which we 
are using the term should be apparent. The term "inference" 
was used to emphasize the fact that, in using this strategy, 
the viewer goes beyond the events portrayed, to a central, 
all-encompassing, authorial meaning. This terminology, 
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together with the theory which it serves, was developed by 
Worth and Gross (1974). 
To put it briefly, then, this was our hypothesis: The less 
control a viewer believes to have gone into the making of a 
film, the more he should use "attribution" to interpret it; the 
more control, the more he should use "inference." This 
hypothesis was tested through the two experiments which we 
shall now describe. 
In the first experiment, the situation was very similar to 
the one described in the hypothetical example above: We 
took the same piece of film and showed it to two sets of 
viewers. One group of viewers was told that the film had 
been made with a hidden camera and that we had picked it 
out at random from a large amount of similarly made 
footage. The other group of viewers was told that the piece 
of film had been clipped out of a longer fiction film which 
had been written, directed, and acted by a group of film 
students. In other words, there were two experimental 
conditions: a minimum-control condition, which we call the 
candid condition, and a maximum-control condition, which 
we shall call staged. 
The til m itself was two minutes long, black-and-white, 
silent, in 8mm, and it showed a man sitting in a nondescript 
room, fidgeting a little, and, at one point, picking his nose. 
There were no cuts in the film. The film was one 
uninterrupted length of celluloid. We decided on nose-
picking as subject matter because we wanted to present the 
viewers with a brief, simple event, which would stand out, 
and which we could reasonably expect most viewers to use in 
forming judgments of the person in the film. 
In the same experiment, we also showed a second film, 
which was a variation on the first: In that film, there was a 
second person in the frame, with his back to the camera. This 
person made talking gestures throughout the length of the 
film and did not alter his behavior during the nose-picking. 
Both films were shot at the same time, with two cameras, but 
in the first one the camera was positioned in such a way as to 
exclude the talker. We shall refer to the first film as the alone 
film and to the second as the together film. Each film was 
shown to two different sets of viewers, corresponding to the 
two experimental conditions. In all, therefore, four sets of 
viewers were used. Each group comprised about 15 persons, 
all of them college students. 
After each showing, questionnaires were passed out to the 
viewers. These questionnaires asked for a variety of things, 
but for present purposes we shall deal with the following 
items only. First, each viewer was asked to give five words to 
describe the person-or persons-in the film. Second, he or 
she was asked to give an explanation for each word. Finally, 
each viewer was asked to rate the person(s) in the film on a 
set of seven bi-polar adjective scales provided by the 
experimenter. These were seven-point scales, and the viewer 
had to circle one point of the scale. The adjective pairs were: 
(1) refined-vulgar, (2) polite-rude, (3) pleasant-unpleasant, 
(4) calm-agitated, (5) friendly-unfriendly, (6) happy-sad, and 
(7) intelligent-stupid . Next to each of the scales was a 
seven-point "confidence scale," ranging from "not at all 
confident" to "completely confident," on which scale each 
viewer was to indicate, in a similar fashion, the degree of 
confidence with which each judgment had been made. Our 
reasons for soliciting these various response items will 
become clear in the discussion of the results, below. 
Before we present the results, however, let us briefly 
outline how we expected the experiment to turn out. It 
should be evident that, broadly speaking, we expected the 
viewers in the candid conditions to use an interpretive 
strategy of attribution while those in the staged conditions 
used a strategy of inference. On a more specific level, we 
expected the following to happen. 
We expected the most obvious interpretation of the 
nose-picking behavior to be that the nose-picker was rude, 
vulgar, etc. In the culture of these particular viewers, this is 
probably the stereotypical interpretation of nose-picking, 
both in real life and in films. However, we expected the 
"candid" conditions to result in a variety of other 
interpretations as well (e.g., "uninhibited behavior," "casual 
life-style," etc.), since we did not believe that-in the eyes of 
college students, at least-there would be any necessary 
connection between real-life nose-picking and the stereo-
typical interpretation. Thus, we expected the viewers in the 
"candid" conditions to produce, on the average, relatively 
moderate judgments of the nose-picker, accompanied by 
relatively moderate confidence levels. 
In contrast to this situation, viewers in the "staged" 
conditions would be confronted with what they believed was 
a deliberately staged implication on the part of the 
filmmaker. Given this belief, we expected them to be much 
more certain that the most obvious, stereotypical inter-
pretation of the nose-picking was to be accepted. Hence, we 
expected them to make more extreme •judgments of the 
nose-picker-in the direction of "vulgarity," "rudeness," 
etc.-and to be more confident in these judgments. 
With these points in mind, we may now examine the 
results. We shall be dealing exclusively with data on the 
nose-picker. Judgments of the talker in the "candid" 
condition were almost identical to those in the "staged" 
condition. This was as expected: vie~ers had minimal 
information on the talker, regardless of condition. Thus, 
their judgments of the talker were uniformly neutral. 
To begin with, then, let us examine the results for scale 
(1 ), refined-vulgar, and the associated confidence scale (Table 
1 ). There are two important points here. (a) For both the 
"alone" and the "together" film, the mean rating of the 
nose-picker was more extreme (tended toward the vulgar end 
of the scale) in the staged condition than in the candid one. 
(b) Similarly, confidence levels were higher in the staged 
condition for both films. These differences were all 
statistically significant. Clearly, these results conform to the 
pattern we had expected. 
The data for the other bipolar adjective scales (Table 1) 
need concern us only very briefly. The results for the 
polite-rude scale follow the pattern of those for the 
refined-vulgar scale. Note, also, that on the polite-rude scale, 
judgments on the "together" film were, in each condition, 
more extreme and more confident than those on the "alone" 
film. This was a predictable finding, since nose-picking in 
public is presumably ruder than nose-picking in private. 
Except for the pleasant-unpleasant scale, the rest of the 
bipolar adjective scales produced few significant differences 
between conditions. This, too, is not a surprising finding: 
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TABLE 1 
EXPERIMENT 1: MEAN RATINGS AND CONFIDENCE LEVELS 
refined (1 )-vulgar(7) 
polite(1 )-rude(7) 
pleasant(1 )-unpleasant(7) 
calm(1 )- agitated(7) 
friendly(1 )-unfriendly(7) 
happy(1 )-sad (7) 
intelligent(1 )-stupid (7) 
refined -vulgar 
polite-rude 
pleasant-unpleasant 
calm-agitated 
friend I y - unfriend I y 
happy-sad 
intelligent-stupid 
Ratings 
Alone 
Candid Staged 
4.1 a 5.5a 
3.88 5.58 
3.5 4.2 
4.5 5.0 
3.3 3.7 
3.6 3.8 
3.4 3.3 
Together 
Candid Staged 
4.2A 6.0A 
4.5c 6.2c 
4.1b 4.9b 
4.6 4.1 
3.7 3.8 
4.5 3.8 
3.6 4.0 
Confidence 
3.3c 4.8c 4.70 6.00 
3.4d 4.9d 5.0 6.0 
3.3e 4.6e 4.9 4.8 
4.8 4.9 5.3 5.0 
3.2E 4.6E 4.3 4.1 
3.5F 5.1 F 4.3 4.3 
3.7 3.8 3.7 3.4 
*Means sharing a common lower-case subscript differ significantly 
at the .05 ,level. Means sharing a common upper-case subscript differ 
significantly at the .01 level. 
predictably, nose-picking in this situation was less infor-
mative with regard to the other adjective pairs. 
Let us now turn to the words chosen by the viewers 
themselves to describe the nose-picker. We picked out all 
those words for which the explanation given was the 
nose-picking. We then assigned these words to two 
categories: negative judgments ("vulgar," ''rude," etc.) and 
neutral or positive judgments ("uninhibited," "natural," 
etc.). 1 Table 2 gives the distribution of these categories by 
condition for each film. As one can see, these data for the 
most part conform to our expectations. For the "alone" 
film, the ratio of unfavorable to other words was 6/9 in the 
"candid" condition and 8/4 in the "staged" condition. 1 n 
other words, viewers in the staged condition were more I ikely 
to pick the unfavorable, stereotypical interpretation, as 
expected. For the "together" film, we have, again, a high 
ratio of unfavorable to other words in the "staged" condition 
(21 /2)_ However, the data for the "candid" condition are 
puzzling: Only five judgments were based on the 
nose-picking (all of them unfavorable), making it hard for us 
to compare this condition with the others. We have no 
TABLE 2 
EXPERIMENT 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF THE NOSE-PICKER 
Negative descriptions 
Neutral/positive descriptions 
Alone 
Candid Staged 
6 8 
9 4 
Together 
Candid Staged 
5 21 
0 2 
explanation for the low number of words based on 
nose-picking in this condition. 
Overall, then, the results of the first experiment 
conformed to our expectations. For both the "alone" and 
the "together" film, the "staged" condition produced more 
negative and more confident judgments of the nose-picker 
than the "candid" condition. We had expected that this 
would occur if viewers in the "candid" conditions tended 
toward using attribution and viewers in the "staged" 
conditions tended toward using inference. The~efore, the 
results of this experiment are consistent with the conclusion 
that such was indeed the case. In other words, the results are 
consistent with our initial hypothesis: The less control a 
viewer assumes to have gone into the making of a film, the 
more he will tend to use real-life knowledge to interpret it; 
the more control he assumes, the more he should base 
interpretations on what he assumes the filmmaker to have 
intended, and therefore implied by the very way he 
organized his film. 
For the second experiment, we prepared a videotape in 
which an individual posing as a subject waiting for an 
experiment picked his nose either while waiting by himself or 
in the presence of another individual. The second experiment 
was modelled after the first one, but it was not a 
straightforward replication. It differed from the first in three 
important ways. First, all subjects, regardless of condition, 
observed the nose-picker both alone and in the presence of 
another person. Second, the experiment used videotape in 
such a way as to try to convince the subjects in the "candid" 
conditions that they were watching a "live" event, occurring 
at the very moment of observation. Finally, by employing an 
open-ended questionnaire and an interview in addition to 
rating scales, we tried to get detailed information-lacking in 
the first experiment-on the reasons subjects gave for their 
judgments of the nose-picker. 
As with the first experiment, two tapes were made. Both 
tapes contained sound. Although neither tape contained any 
edits, each tape can be divided into four sections. The first 
and fourth sections, each approximately five minutes in 
length, contained a shot of an empty waiting room. Only 
viewers in the candid conditions saw these two sections. The 
second section of the tape begins with a "secretary" showing 
the nose-picker into the room and asking him to wait until 
"they" are ready. The nose-picker sits down to wait, briefly 
looks around the room, begins shuffling through some 
magazines on a table in front of him, and finally selects two 
to leaf through. This section, lasting approximately a minute 
and a half, is termed the "alone" section. The third section, 
the "together" section, begins with the same secretary 
showing a second person into the room and asking him to 
wait. (In the tape condition, this person was supposed to be a 
"fellow-subject," waiting for the fictional "experimenters" 
to show up. In the real life condition, this person was the 
administrator of the experiment we are describing.) After 
trading "hellos," the second person (referred to, from now 
on, as the experimenter) sits down to wait, and the 
nose-picker returns to his magazine. After shuffling through 
some magazines, the experimenter m1t1ates a casual 
conversation with the nose-picker. The conversation lasts 
until the secretary reenters about five minutes later and asks 
both to follow her out of the room. The two tapes differ 
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with regard to the point at which the nose-picker picks his 
nose. In the tape shown in the alone conditions, the 
nose-picker picks his nose while waiting by himself. In the 
tape used in the together conditions, nose-picking occurs 
about half-way through the conversation, while the 
experimenter is talking. 
Forty paid volunteers served as viewers, 10 in each of the 
four conditions. All were university students and participated 
in the experiment either alone (20) or in pairs (20). Viewers 
were told one of two cover stories. 
In the candid conditions, viewers were led into an 
observation room containing a television monitor that was 
already screening the first section of the tape, a shot of an 
empty room. The monitor was hooked up to a VTR 
(videotape recorder) situated in an adjacent office, but the 
viewers were led to believe that they were witnessing a live 
monitor. The experimenter announced that several re-
searchers (unidentified) had become interested in the effects 
on character and personality judgments of viewing people via 
television; that another subject, whom he did not know, had 
been scheduled for the same time but would be shown into 
the waiting room appearing on the monitor; that there was a 
closed-circuit television system hooked up between that 
room and the observation room; and that the camera was 
hidden and the room rigged for sound. The experimenter 
then told candid-condition viewers that when the un-
suspecting person (the nose-picker) was shown into the 
waiting room, he (the experimenter) would leave and be 
"shown" into the room, where he would pretend to be a 
fellow-subject, waiting for the experiment. After about five 
minutes, he would return to the observation room, where 
both he and the observing subjects would fill out a 
questionnaire on their impressions of the waiting individual. 
A short interview to help the research group structure a more 
formal experiment would follow the questionnaire. 
In the staged conditions, the VTR was in the same room 
as the monitor. It was turned off when the subjects entered 
but preset for the beginnjng of the second section (alone) of 
the tape. The experimenter wore different clothes from those 
used in the taping . The experimenter told viewers that he was 
finishing a television lab in which he had written and direct ed 
a film and that, as part of the course requirements, he had 
cut the film into segments of different sizes and was 
screening them to groups of students, the purpose being to 
discover how judgments would change depend ing on the 
segment viewed. Viewers would watch one of the segments 
and then fill out a questionnaire and participate in an 
int erview. 
As with the first experiment, then, there were four 
conditions in this second experiment: (1) alone-candid, (2) 
alone-staged, (3) together-candid, (4) together-staged. View-
ers in each condition made judgments about the nose-picker 
on 13 bipolar adjective scales similar to those used in the first 
experiment. Likewise, a seven-point confidence scale was 
appended to each rating scale. Of the 13 rating scales, six 
were cons idered critical to this experiment : refined-vulgar, 
polite-rude, pleasant-unpleasant, calm-agitated, friendly-
unfriendly, warm-cold . The remaining scales were fillers . As 
expected, there were no significant diffe rences between any 
conditions in judgments made on the fi lle r rating scales . Our 
discussion will focus o n th e c ritical scales and t he statements 
viewers made about them. How did we expect subjects in 
each of the four conditions to judge the nose-picker on the 
six critical scales? 
We expected that judgments by alone-candid viewers 
would be determined by two factors. As with the first 
experiment, we expected the private, "candid" nose-picking 
to be relatively uninformative, on the average. In fact, during 
the interviews, only four of the 10 alone-candid viewers gave 
nose-picking as a reason for making any judgment about the 
nose-picker. Furthermore, since the nose-picker was dressed 
attractively and engaged in a pleasant conversation with the 
experimenter, alone-candid viewers would see him as "acting 
naturally" and as a ''nice guy.'' They would make positive, 
although not necessarily very confident, judgments about 
him. 
In the together-candid condition, on the other hand, the 
contradiction presented by a conservatively dressed student 
pleasantly engaged in a conversation while picking his nose 
would preclude the lumping together of positive judgments 
across several scales under a broad personality description 
("nice guy"). Together-candid viewers would have to pay 
closer attention to each particular rating scale and to the 
subtleties of the nose-picker's behavior. Judgments and 
confidence levels on each critical scale would vary depending 
on the type and number of reasons which viewers could 
observe in assessing the nose-picker's traits. 
The judgments of viewers in staged conditions would, we 
believed, be determined by their assumption of the 
filmmaker's control over the film. Most of us tend to believe 
that a filmmaker is responsible for what happens within his 
film; the determination of his intentions and the meaning of 
his film depend upon this accountability. For the 
alone-staged viewers then, the nose-picking would be 
assumed to be intentional and, therefore , relatively more 
communicatively meaningful than for the alone-candid 
viewers . In contrast to the alone-candid viewers, seven of the 
10 alone-staged viewers gave nose-picking as a reason for 
making judgments about the nose-picker as a character 
(distinguished, of course, from the real-life person who was, 
rather than was portraying, a nose-picker) . Since alone-staged 
viewers would be assessing the nose-picking as a symbolic 
event, they would treat it with confidence as implying 
something negative about the nose-picker. 
Similarly, we expected that together-staged viewers would 
make negative judgments about the nose-picker. Unlike 
viewers in the together-candid condition, who would try to 
estimate the nose-picker's position on each scale, together-
staged viewers would treat the nose-picking as a clear 
implication by the filmmaker that the nose-picker was not a 
nice person . Consequently, judgments by together-staged 
viewers would be very confident. 
In Table 3 we have lumped the six critical scales together 
to give a general overview of the distribution of viewers' 
judgments in each condition. The scales may be treated as 
running from extreme positive judgments (1) to extreme 
negative judgments (7). 
Table 3 indicates that the pattern of judgments by viewers 
in each condition generally-but not entirely-confirmed our 
expectations. The majority of judgments by alone-candid 
viewers were positive. A large number of judgments by 
alone-staged viewers were negative, but not extreme. 
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Together-candid viewers made fewer extreme, pos1t1ve 
judgments and more negative ones than alone-candid viewers. 
In the together-staged condition, judgments tended to be 
very extreme; however, the distribution of judgments is 
bimodal. We shall return to this bimodality a little later. 
1 {+) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 {-) 
Mean = 
TABLE 3 
EXPERIMENT 2: DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGMENTS* 
Alone 
Candid Staged 
14 
16 
16 
8 
5 
2.6 
8 
7 
10 
11 
15 
7 
2 
3.8 
Together 
Candid Staged 
5 8 
21 16 
10 4 
10 4 
5 8 
5 15 
4 5 
3.3 3.7 
*"Positive" judgments {+)are represented by lower numbers {1 to 
3); "negative" judgments{-) by higher numbers {5 to 7). 
Table 4 gives the mean rating levels for each of the six 
critical scales by condition and supports the distribution data 
shown in Table 3. Judgments by alone-candid viewers are 
extremely positive. Alone-staged viewers are negative or 
neutral in their judgments. The exception is the polite-rude 
scale (mean=2.1) where alone-staged viewers found specific 
reasons (e.g., "He didn't pick his nose while you were with 
him"; "He kept the conversation going when he didn't have 
to") for making judgments on this scale. Together-candid 
viewers are less positive than alone-candid viewers, but are 
clearly negative only on the refined-vulgar scale (mean=4.7). 
Judgments by together-staged viewers, while somewhat 
negative, tend to hover about the mid-point of each scale. 
Given Table 3, however, this can be seen as resulting from 
the bimodal distribution of judgments. Significance tests 
-reveal a general candid-staged main effect across the critical 
scales, with the exception of the polite-rude scale and the 
refined-vulgar scale. 
Table 4 also shows the mean confidence levels for each 
rating scale by condition. The most surprising finding is that 
subjects in all four conditions were able to make highly 
confident judgments. In no case were confidence levels in the 
lower half of the seven-point continuum. Among the four 
conditions, the high confidence of alone-candid viewers is the 
most puzzling. Here, it is interesting to note that in the 
alone-candid condition mean confidence levels on critical 
scales averaged 1.5 points higher than mean confidence levels 
on filler scales. (A similar pattern was found for the other 
conditions.) The high confidence displayed by alone-candid 
viewers on critical scales can, perhaps, be best understood by 
taking two factors into consideration. First, it may be that 
judgments on the critical scales could be based-partially, at 
least-on the nature of the situation (i.e., a waiting room in 
which a certain typical range of behavior may confidently be 
TABLE 4: 
EXPERIMENT 2: MEAN RATINGS AND CONFIDENCE LEVELS* 
refined (1 )-vulgar(7) 
polite(1 )-rude(7) 
pleasant{1 )-unpleasant(7) 
calm(1 )-agitated(7) 
friendly(1 )-unfriendly(7) 
warm{1 )-cold{7) 
refined -vulgar 
polite-rude 
pleasant-unpleasant 
calm-agitated 
friendly-unfriendly 
warm-cold 
Ratings 
Alone 
Candid Staged 
3.8 4.5 
1.9 2.1 
2.0a 3.4a 
2.8b 4.8b 
1.8A 3.4A 
3.5c 4.5c 
Together 
Candid Staged 
4.7 4.1 
2.9 3.6 
2.9 3.4 
3.6 4.5 
2.8 3.4 
3.5 4.3 
Confidence 
4.9 5.4 5.9 5.2 
5.8 6.2 6.2 6.2 
5.8 5.9 6.2 6.3 
5.0 5.6 5.8 5.3 
5.6 5.3 6.2 6.6 
4.2 5.2 5.5 5.6 
*Means sharing a common lower-case subscript differ significantly 
at the .05 level. Means sharing a common upper-case subscript differ 
significantly at the .01 level. 
expected) rather than on the actual behavior of the 
participants in the situation. Second, alone-candid viewers 
made statements to the effect that the nose-picker was acting 
"naturally," etc. Given these factors, gross behavioral events 
(e.g., keeping the conversation going) may have been 
sufficiently rei iable indicators of general traits to allow for 
confident judgments. When the high confidence of 
alone-candid viewers is taken into consideration, it is not 
surprising to find a general lack of numerically significant 
findings in Table 4. The table must be interpreted in terms of 
general trends. 
With this in mind, Table 4 tends to confirm our 
expectations. Judgments by alone-staged viewers tend to be 
somewhat more confident than judgments by alone-candid 
viewers; and judgments by together-staged viewers tend to be 
somewhat more confident than judgments by alone-staged 
viewers. The various confidence scales for together-candid 
viewers, however, are difficult to interpret, for we had 
expected that confidence in this condition would vary with 
extremity of judgment. Extreme negative or positive 
judgments would be very confident due to careful attention 
to the nose-picker's behavior, while lower confidence levels 
would be associated with neutral responses. Table 4 indicates 
that together-candid viewers showed relatively I ittle variation 
in confidence levels. 
In general, the together-candid condition produced results 
which we cannot entirely account for. We have pointed out 
that in this experiment's together-candid condition, 
nose-picking conflicted with the positive attributes of the 
nose-picker's dress and conversation. As we had expected, 
this discrepancy elicited from the viewers closer attention to 
the more subtle details of the nose-picker's behavior (e.g., 
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"His voice tended to drop off at the end of his sentences"; 
"His answers came too quickly after your questions"). 
Contrary, however, to our expectations-or, at least, to our 
design-some of the together-candid viewers resolved this 
discrepancy by doubting the "candidness" of the 
nose-picking (although not necessarily the truthfulness of the 
experimenter; the possibility was brought up that he too was 
being duped by the higher authorities for whom the study 
was being performed). Of the eight viewers who reported 
that they had observed the nose-picking, six said that they 
believed that it might have been staged rather than candid. 
Each of these six had previously participated in at least one 
psychology experiment; four had been in three or more. 
Moreover, five of these six viewers reported that, in spite of 
their doubts about the candid nature of the event they were 
witnessing, they attempted to treat it as though it were real. 
They pretended that the waiting-room situation was candid, 
even though their prior experience suggested that it wasn't. 
Our interviews with together-candid viewers, however, 
indicated that the effects of doubt and pretending upon 
judgments were not uniform. For some viewers, a rating scale 
was treated as an implication on the part of the 
experimenters and interpreted in a way similar to that used 
by together-staged viewers. Other viewers saw or pretended 
to see the same scale in terms of the nose-picker's "natural" 
personality. And, finally, some viewers saw the implications 
of the experimenters as "masking" the nose-picker's true 
character and either sought out more confirming or 
disconfirming information in his behavior or simply rated the 
nose-picker opposite to the inferred implication. Thus, the 
together-candid condition failed to provide us with the 
information for which it had been intended, i.e., how viewers 
who believed in the candidness of the taped situation would 
interpret it. However, th'e results of this condition were not 
without interest within the context of our overall scheme, as 
we hope to show in the course of the following discussion of 
the together-staged condition. 
We have already noted (Tables 3 and 4) that the 
distribution of judgments by together-staged subjects was 
bimodal. What could account for this? As part of the 
interview, we obtained from all viewers information on 
whether they had observed the nose-picking, whether they 
had thought it noteworthy, and how they had used it in 
making judgments. In the staged -together condition , six 
viewers reported having observed the nose-picking and used it 
in explaining their judgments; one viewer reported having 
observed it but not having considered it noteworthy; and 
three viewers reported that they were not sure the 
nose-picker had picked his nose. It is this 6-4 split between 
users and nonusers of the nose-picking as judgmental 
evidence which appears to account for the bimodality 
observed in the distributions in the staged-together 
condition. 
In pursuing this interpretation, we computed the mean 
rating levels for the six using and fou r nonusing viewers on 
each critical scale. These numbers confirm the explanation 
given above for the biomodality. On each scale, viewers who 
did use the nose-picking made negative judgments about the 
nose-picker, while those who did not made positive 
judgments. 
The consequence of using vs. not using the nose-picking in 
making a judgment of the nose-picker was probably 
predictable. What is of interest in this condition is that so 
many viewers (four out of 10) did not attend to the 
nose-picking. We interpret this result to be illustrative of the 
difference which "staging" makes to a perceiver's attention 
to and interpretation of a scene. 
As Birdwhistell (1970:151) has pointed out, one of the 
ways in which fictional conversations (not only in movies but 
also in literature, the theater, and comic books) depart from 
reality is in the regularity and orderliness of turn-taking: with 
relatively rare exceptions, conventional fictional speakers 
exchange lines without interruption and the focus of the 
encounter shifts back and forth from one speaker to another 
in concert with this exchange. This is perhaps most nicely 
illustrated when a fictional conversation is filmed in a 
two-shot and the camera's focus literally shifts back and 
forth between two speakers in a single frame. All this is quite 
contrary to many real-1 ife conversational situations, in which 
speakers' I ines overlap or interrupt each other and, even in 
the absence of verbal synchrony, the meaning of an 
encounter is nevertheless located not in a single participant 
(the "speaker") but in an interaction in which all participants 
are continuously engaged. Given this state of affairs, it is also 
reasonable to assume that an observer of a fictional 
("staged") conversation applies different rules to this 
observation from those which he would apply to the 
observation of a real-life conversation. Specifically, we want 
to suggest that, when in the presence of a staged 
conversation, the typical viewer has learned to shift his 
attention from one Character to another in conjunction with 
the exchange of spoken I ines; whereas, when confronted with 
a real -life conversation, the observer cannot as easily 
disregard the (non-verbal) contribution of a non-speaker to 
the ongoing event. In terms of this experiment, then, we 
might say that the viewers in the together-candid condition 
had to pay attention to both "speaker" and "listener," 
whereas those in the together-staged condition could 
selectively focus their attention on the "speaker" alone. 
Since the nose-picking occurred when the nose-picker was 
acting as listener, this interpretation would account for the 
relatively high number of viewers who "missed" the 
nose-picking in the together-staged condition. It should also 
be noted, however, that together-candid viewers had an 
additional reason for paying attention to the nose-picker 
even when he was not speaking; they had been asked to 
assess his personality. (Finally, we should also repeat that, in 
the first experiment, the "talker" was filmed with his back to 
the camera, thus directing attention to the "nose-picker" at 
all times and vitiating the comparability of the two 
experiments in this respect. The reader should also recall that 
the film used in the first experiment was silent.) 
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If this interpretation of our results in the together-staged 
condition is accepted, then it would appear that the second 
experiment, too, confirms our expectations about the 
differences between what Worth & Gross have called 
"attributional" and "inferential" interpretational strategies 
(with due regard, of course, for the problematic results in the 
second experiment's together-candid condition). 
To recapitulate, then: Those aspects of a film or videotape 
which a viewer assumes to be free of control (or authorial 
purpose) will be interpreted according to interpretational 
rules appropriate to the corresponding real-life event (i.e., he 
will use the interpretational strategy of attribution). On the 
other hand, those symbolic events which he assumes to have 
been staged will be interpreted according to what he assesses 
as the producer's intent (i.e., he will use inference). 
Several observations need to be added to the above 
explication of our experiments. In the experiments we have 
just described, we were concerned mainly with the 
polarization and confidence of interpretations. This should 
not be taken to mean that we believe such extreme 
interpretations and the confidence with which they were 
made to be the most important, most frequent, or most 
typical aspects in which interpretations vary according to 
perceived degree of control. Our argument in this respect was 
specific to the films we used and the kinds of viewers who 
saw them. A different kind of film might have elicited other 
kinds of differences. All we wanted to show was that, at least 
in some cases, perceived degree of control does make a 
difference to the final outcome of the interpretation and that 
this difference stems from the use of different 
interpretational strategies (attribution vs . inference). 
The "significant event" in our experimental films-a 
character's action (i.e., the nose-picking)-represents only 
one of the many ways in which meaning can be built into a 
film. We have said nothing in this paper about editing, 
camera angles, choice of lenses, etc., although it is on these 
aspects of film, treated as signs of what to attend to, that 
most film theorists have concentrated. However, some recent 
film research has gone in the direction of dealing with the 
characters' actions, motions, positioning, etc. Some 
investigators have become exasperated with the long and 
generally unproductive search for linguistic-like units of the 
order of editing (and other such essentially "framing" 
devices) and are now turning their attention toward the 
actual events within the temporal or spatial "frame." For 
example, Bettetini (1973:55) suggests that it may be time to 
begin borrowing from kinesics and proxemics for the analysis 
of film. The results of our experiments would suggest the 
following: Possible similarities between fiction-film events 
and real -life events on the articulatory level are not to be 
taken as evidence for a similarity on the level of meaning. In 
other words, the uncritical application of the findings-as 
distinct from the methods-of kinesics, proxemics, etc., to 
fiction fi I m may I ead to error. There is another side to the 
above observation. Some investigators of the communica-
tional aspects of body motion have traditionally used 
obviously staged films (and posed photographs) with their 
informants. The implicit assumption behind this kind of 
work seems to be that the informants' interpretation of the 
staged material is identical to what it would be if they were 
confronted with the corresponding real-life event. This, of 
course, is the assumption whose fallacy we have tried to 
show in this study. By using staged material in their research, 
investigators are ending up with detailed information on the 
meaning of acted facial expressions, gestures, etc., but 
questionable evidence on the communicational patterning of 
body motion in real life. 2 Naturally, there are nuances with 
which the attribution-inference distinction-as presented 
here-does not deal. We would be the first to acknowledge 
that these nuances are lost in our data, in part because of the 
quantitative form of the bulk of these data. For example, it 
may well be that a given viewer's beliefs about some aspects 
of real-life behavior are actually the product of familiarity 
with supposedly realistic fictional portrayals of that kind of 
behavior (on TV or in movies). To the extent that this is 
true, the viewer's use of attribution as an interpretive 
strategy may unconsciously involve reliance on fictional 
codes, conventions or stereotypes of behavior. 
Conversely, since fiction films rarely deliberately proclaim · 
their artificiality-indeed, they usually purport to be realistic 
representations-we cannot assume that a viewer will always 
maintain an awareness of the "stagedness" of that which he 
is watching. In the experiments we desOfibed, the brevity 
(and the pedestrian quality) of the films we used made it 
difficult for the viewer to forget the explicit introductory 
information as to the nature ("candid" vs. "staged") of the · 
films. But with a feature-length fiction film, in which 
exciting or moving things may happen, whatever detachment 
a viewer may have started out with can frequently give way 
to an illusion of reality or to a so-called suspension of 
disbelief. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to 
assume that "attributions" may coexist with "inferences" in 
a particular viewer's interpretations of a specific film. 
In general then, what seems to have been clarified by 
these experiments is our understanding that viewers of filmed 
events do not use the same strategies when interpreting 
symbolic events which they have assumed to be real that 
they use to interpret events which they assume to be acted or 
contrived. Further we have shown that it is the amount of 
control that the viewers assume to have been exerted in the 
production of the event which determines in large part the 
strategy used in its interpretation. This is not only of 
importance in helping us to understand how we deal with our 
fictional and real worlds when seen on film in a context of 
"narrative," "news," or "documentary," but also is 
important in helping us clarify how we may interpret 
"scientific" footage of human behavior in field, classroom, 
and experimental conditions. The assumptions we make 
about the behavior of the producer of a symbolic event play 
at least as great a part as the assumptions we make about the 
behavior of the "actors" in "real" or "symbolic" worlds. It 
might even be said that these assumptions help us to 
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determine which events we want to label "real" or 
"symbolic." 
NOTES 
1 Here is a list of the words in question, classified into our 
two categories, by condition. "Alone" film, "candid" condition 
(N=15); negative words: gross, common, vain, gross, gross/unman-
nerly; neutral/positive words: uninhibited, humanistic, human, real, 
natural, typical, normal, anyone. "Alone" film; "staged" condition 
(N=14); negative words : obnoxious, bore, slob, boisterous, inconsi-
derate, gross, strange, no manners; neutral/positive words: uninhi-
bited, unashamed, open, normal. "Together" film; "candid" 
condition (N=15); negative words: gross, rude, insecure, bad manners, 
sick. "Together" film; "staged" condition (N=19); negative words : 
rude, ill-mannered, crude, common, gross, repulsive, antagonistic, 
rude, gross, rude, ignorant, slob, repulsive, careless, slob, no manner, 
rude, impolite, vulgar, rude, rude annoying; neutral/positve words·: 
normal, frank. 
2 This is one of the points made by Birdwhistell (1970 :153-155) 
and Mead (1975) in discussions of this type of research. 
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